Subject: Airbus Vs Boeing and The Last Four Minutes of Air France Flight 447
From: Rotary Engine
Date: 3/30/2010, 3:10 PM
To: AAA Put this in the To box



The World Trade Organization is now saying what Boeing and U.S. trade
officials have been saying for decades: Airbus was illegally subsidized to
develop new products that competed directly with Boeing products. "Today's
final ruling puts any doubts to rest - launch aid is an illegal subsidy that
has cost America jobs, hurt our ability to compete and damaged our overall
economy," Sen. Patty Murray, D-Wash., said. The ruling went beyond
determining the legality of start-up money. It said that Airbus would not
have been able to overtake Boeing as the biggest aircraft maker in the world
without the subsidies and that they cost U.S. jobs. Although the ruling
seems unequivocal, what it means in practical terms is far less clear.

Airbus is appealing the decision and how long that appeal could drag on is
not known. If, at the end of it all, the ruling sticks, the question of how
to penalize Airbus will become the issue. Assuming Airbus continues to
maintain its innocence, the only option left might be for the U.S. to impose
trade sanctions on the company, which, until a week ago, was bidding to
supply $30 billion worth of tankers for the U.S. Air Force. Boeing said the
ruling might make other countries think twice about funding airliner
development from the public purse. "Markets, not parliaments, should pick
the winners in the global aerospace market," Boeing said in a statement.

====================================================================

I feel compelled to tell of my experiences on A330s.  I have only flown on
three A330 flights as a passenger, but I've had two incidents during which I
thought I was going to die.

One was a 'two-second' event, a rudder doublet, in moderate turbulence, in
the middle of the Atlantic Ocean.  A rudder doublet is a flight test
technique that is never done with passengers on board, and which has been
known to break vertical tails off airplanes.  Fortunately I did not hear any
loud noises indicating structural failure so it was only a few seconds of
terror.  I never got any feedback on whether the pilots or airplane created
the rudder doublet.

The other was a 'two-minute' event departing Beijing.  This will take a few
more words to describe:

After pushback we delayed on the taxiway for 45 minutes with many other
airplanes taxiing around us for takeoff.  On takeoff at about 2000 ft
altitude in daylight clear air, we leveled off and our A330 started
'wallowing' around, wings up/down about 30 degrees and back to level, nose
up and nose down increasingly to about 20 degrees each way, for about two
minutes.  In my almost 40 years doing test flying and passenger flying, I
have never been on an airplane that behaved like that.  The only airplanes
I've seen on film behaving like that always crashed.  I thought we had lost
our flight control systems, that we were becoming dynamically unstable, and
that we would soon stall or flip on our backs and crash.  My Grandmother had
always told me that I would die flying, and this day I thought her
prediction was coming true.  Eventually the airplane started behaving
normally and we continued on our way to Seattle.

The Boeing Dispatcher I was traveling with also thought the same thing--that
we were going to die.  The flight attendant came on the PA shortly afterward
and apologized for "the turbulence."
Toward the end of the flight, the flight attendants gave us comment cards,
and I of course wrote up what I thought.  I watched as the one who read my
comments stopped in her tracks.  The Captain came back to talk to me.  The
Captain said that the airplane behavior was "normal" for Airbus.  He even
showed me the Jeppesen international flight plan format (which I am very
familiar with), and said that "the turbulence" was caused by the vertical
shear component ("S=2") forecast for shortly after takeoff.

I brief the effects of vertical shear all the time to our airline customers
(whether or not I'm flying with them) to help them prepare for possible
turbulence. We are never concerned unless S=6 or greater, and the wind speed
is greater than 50 knots.

On our flight during that event, there was no "bumping around" that normally
accompanies turbulence, so I have a very hard time believing the airplane's
behavior was due to vertical shear.

I asked the Captain if we were on autopilot during that time, and he said
yes. I then asked the Captain if disconnecting the autopilot and hand flying
would have made a difference, and he said no.

After the Captain went back to the flight deck, one of the flight attendants
sat down with our dispatcher and told him that they had been scared
also--that they had never been on an airplane that behaved like that either.

This event occurred about a month after the Air France mishap.  My initial
thoughts were of flight control system failure (to direct law?), based on
our flight conditions.  I have not been able to get more definitive
information from the airline, except that I have verified that the airplane
had US (Goodrich) pitot static sensors.

It's not because I work for Boeing that I pass along this information.  I
think Airbus makes some good airplanes, but I don't think the A330 is one of
them based on my personal experience.

People who know me know that I am not a white-knuckled flyer.  However, it
will be only a true emergency that will ever get me back on an A330 as a
passenger.

Thanks for listening.

============================================================
Death in the Atlantic

The Last Four Minutes of Air France Flight 447

By Gerald Traufetter

The crash of Air France flight 447 from Rio to Paris last year is one of the
most mysterious accidents in the history of aviation. After months of
investigation, a clear picture has emerged of what went wrong. The
reconstruction of the horrific final four minutes reveal continuing safety
problems in civil aviation.

One tiny technical failure heralded the impending disaster. But the
measurement error was so inconspicuous that the pilots in the cockpit of the
Airbus A330 probably hardly noticed it.

Air France flight 447
<http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,628182,00.html>  had been
in the air for three hours and 40 minutes since taking off from Rio de
Janeiro on the evening of May 31, 2009. Strong turbulence had been shaking
the plane for half an hour, and all but the hardiest frequent flyers were
awake.

Suddenly the gauge indicating the external temperature rose by several
degrees, even though the plane was flying at an altitude of 11 kilometers
(36,000 feet) and it hadn't got any warmer outside. The false reading was
caused by thick ice crystals forming on the sensor on the outside of the
plane. These crystals had the effect of insulating the detector. It now
appears that this is when things started going disastrously wrong.

Flying through thunderclouds over the Atlantic, more and more ice was hurled
at the aircraft. In the process, it knocked out other, far more important,
sensors: the pencil-shaped airspeed gauges known as pitot tubes.

One alarm after another lit up the cockpit monitors. One after another, the
autopilot, the automatic engine control system, and the flight computers
shut themselves off. "It was like the plane was having a stroke," says
Gérard Arnoux, the head of the French pilots union SPAF.

The final minutes of flight AF 447 had begun. Four minutes after the
airspeed indicator failed, the plane plunged into the ocean, killing all 228
people on board.

Few airline crashes in recent years have subsequently unnerved passengers to
quite the same extent. "How was it possible that an Airbus from such an
apparently safe airline could simply disappear?" they wondered.

Passengers on the Rio-Paris route are still uneasy as they board their
plane. After the accident, the flight number was changed to AF 445. Many
frequent flyers have since opted for daytime flights across the Atlantic
because pilots can recognize storm fronts more easily during the day.

Another large-scale search for the stricken plane's "black box" flight
recorders is due to begin in the coming weeks. Once again some 2,000 square
kilometers (800 square miles) of mountainous ocean floor will be swept, some
of it by a submarine from from the northern German city of Kiel. "We
shouldn't speculate about the causes of the accident until the search has
been completed," says Jean-Paul Troadec, the director of the French air
crash investigation agency BEA.

Other experts are less guarded in their comments. "We know pretty well why
the accident happened," says union boss Arnoux.

'An Accident Like This Could Happen Again'

Over the course of several months of investigation, experts have gathered
evidence that allows them to reconstruct with relative accuracy what
happened on board during those last four minutes. It has also brought to
light a safety flaw that affects all jet airplanes currently in service. "An
accident like this could happen again at any time," Arnoux predicts.

Experts reconstructed dozens of incidents involving Airbus planes to try to
piece together the puzzle of this particular disaster. Plane wreckage and
body parts give crucial clues as to what brought the plane down. Crash
investigators also conducted detailed analyses of the 24 automatic fault
messages that the aircraft sent to Air France headquarters by satellite in
the run-up to the accident. One particular message -- the very last one
transmitted before impact -- could solve the mystery surrounding flight AF
447.

A half moon lit up the Atlantic Ocean on the night of May 31, offering
reasonably favorable conditions for a flight through the dangerous
intertropical convergence zone. That's where violent thunderstorms rage and
columns of thick clouds bar the way like an aerial obstacle course. In
addition to the on-board radar, the moon helps pilots identify dangerous
cloud formations and take appropriate measures.

On the night of the tragedy, other planes diverted their flight paths and
took a detour around the danger zone.

Why then did flight AF 447 head straight into the deadly storm system? Is it
possible that the tragedy began even before the plane took off?

Galeão Airport, Rio de Janeiro, 6pm local time: Preparation for takeoff

Captain Marc Dubois, 58, goes through the flight plan of AF 447: He enters a
starting weight of 232.757 tons into the on-board computer, 243 kilograms
less than the maximum permissible weight for the A330. As well as the
passengers' luggage, the ground crews load 10 tons of freight into the cargo
bay. Dubois has more than 70 tons of kerosene pumped into the fuel tanks.
That sounds a lot more than it actually is, because the plane consumes up to
100 kilograms of kerosene every minute. The fuel reserves don't give much
leeway.

It's only by means of a trick that the captain can even reach Paris without
going under the legally required minimum reserves of kerosene that must
still be in the plane's tanks upon arrival in the French capital. A loophole
allows him to enter Bordeaux -- which lies several hundred kilometers closer
than Paris -- as the fictitious destination for his fuel calculations.

"Major deviation would therefore no longer have been possible anymore," says
Gerhard Hüttig, an Airbus pilot and professor at the Berlin Technical
University's Aerospace Institute. If worse came to worst, the pilot would
have to stop and refuel in Bordeaux, or maybe even in Lisbon. "But pilots
are very reluctant to do something like that," Hüttig adds. After all, it
makes the flight more expensive, causes delays and is frowned upon by
airline bosses.

After takeoff, Dubois quickly takes the plane up to a cruising altitude of
35,000 feet (10.6 kilometers), an altitude known as "flight level 350."
According to his kerosene calculations, he has to climb far further, to
above 11 kilometers, where the thin air reduces his fuel consumption.

It's not known whether he actually reached this altitude. Three hours after
leaving Rio, Captain Dubois contacted Brazilian air traffic control for the
last time. "Flight level 350," he reported. It was to be his last
communication with the outside world.

Part 2: Minute One: The Sensors Fail

It's hard to imagine a more precarious situation, even for pilots with
nerves of steel: Flying through a violent thunderstorm that shakes the
entire plane as the master warning lamp starts blinking on the instrument
panel in front of you. An earsplitting alarm rings out, and a whole series
of error messages suddenly flash up on the flight motor.

The crew immediately recognized that the three airspeed indicators all gave
different readings. "A situation like that goes well a hundred times and
badly once," says Arnoux, who flies an Airbus A320 himself.

The responsible pilot now had very little time to choose the correct flight
angle and the correct engine thrust. This is the only way he could be
certain to keep flying on a stable course and maintain steady airflow across
the wings if he didn't know the plane's actual speed. The co-pilot must
therefore look up the two safe values in a table in the relevant handbook --
at least that's the theory.

"In practice, the plane is shaken about so badly that you have difficulty
finding the right page in the handbook, let alone being able to decipher
what it says," says Arnoux. "In situations like that, mistakes are
impossible to rule out."

Danger of Icing Up

Aerospace experts have long known how dangerous it can be if the airspeed
indicators fail because the pitot tubes ice up. In 1998, for example, a
Lufthansa Airbus circling over Frankfurt Airport lost its airspeed
indicator, and a potential tragedy was only averted when the ice melted as
the plane descended. At the time, German air accident investigators at the
German Federal Bureau of Aircraft Accident Investigation (BFU) in
Braunschweig demanded that the specifications of the pitot tubes be changed
to enable "unrestricted flight in severely icy conditions."

As early as 2005, the French aerospace company Thales, which manufactures
the pitot tubes used on flight AF 447, set up a project group called Adeline
to search for new technical solutions to the problem. According to a Thales
document, loss of the airspeed indicators "could cause aircraft crashes,
especially in cases in which the sensors ice up."

Aircraft manufacturer Airbus was well aware of the shortcomings of the
Thales pitot tubes. An internal list kept by the airline manufacturer shows
there were nine incidents involving them between May and October 2008 alone.

More than two months before the Air France crash, the issue had been raised
at a meeting between Airbus and the European Aviation Safety Agency.
However, the EASA decided against banning the particularly error-prone pitot
tubes made by Thales.

In fact, the problem with the airspeed indicators lies far deeper. To this
day, the relevant licensing bodies still only test pitot tubes down to
temperatures of minus 40 degrees Celsius (minus 40 degrees Fahrenheit) and
an altitude of about 9,000 meters (30,000 feet). These completely antiquated
specifications date back to 1947 -- before the introduction of jet planes.

What's more, most of the incidents of recent years, including that involving
the ill-fated flight AF 447, occurred at altitudes above 10,000 meters
(33,000 feet).

Part 3: Minute Two: Loss of Control

Did the pilots on flight AF 447 know about the airspeed indicator failures
experienced by colleagues on nine other aircraft belonging to their own
airline? Air France had indeed distributed a note about this to all its
pilots, albeit as part of several hundred pages of information that pilots
find in their inbox every week. One thing is certain: The pilots on flight
AF 447 had never trained in a flight simulator for a high-altitude breakdown
of the airspeed indicator.

The situation in the cockpit was made even more difficult by the fact that
the flight computer of the A330 put itself into a kind of emergency program.
The plane's digital brain usually supervises all activity by its pilots --
at least, as long as its sensors provide reliable data. Without a speed
reading, the computer more or -less throws in the towel, which doesn't make
things easier for the pilots.

"The controls suddenly feel completely different to the pilot," says flight
expert Hüttig. The sheer complexity of the Airbus' systems makes it
difficult to control in critical phases of the flight. It would be easier
for pilots if they could simply switch the computer off in critical
situations, as is possible on Boeing planes.

Pitot tubes sometimes also fail on Boeing aircraft. When SPIEGEL contacted
the American Federal Aviation Administration, the body which oversees
civilian flight in the US, the FAA confirmed that there had been eight such
incidents on a Boeing 777, three on a 767, and one each on a 757 and a
Jumbo. Boeing is currently conducting a study on the safety effects of
"high-altitude pitot icing on all models in its product line," says FAA
spokeswoman Alison Duquette. The FAA did not, however, identify "any safety
issues arising" during these incidents.

Could it therefore be that the flight computer, which is hard to manage in
emergencies, actually contributed to the loss of control by the Airbus
pilots? Air-safety experts Hüttig and Arnoux are demanding an immediate
investigation into how the Airbus system reacts to a failure of its airspeed
sensors.

Unexpected Reaction

In early March, the BFU in Germany is due to publish the findings of its
investigation into the near-crash of a Lufthansa A320 two years ago at
Fuhlsbüttel Airport in Hamburg, a report that will undoubtedly prove
uncomfortable reading for Airbus. In that incident, an unexpected reaction
by the flight computer caused the jet's left wing to scrape along the runway
while landing. The BFU is due to issue 12 safety recommendations, some of
which concern Airbus' computer programs.

So far, it's unclear who was controlling the Air France plane in its final
minutes. Was it the experienced flight captain, Dubois, or one of his two
first officers? Typically, a captain retreats to his cabin to rest a while
after takeoff. Indeed, there's corroborative evidence to suggest that the
captain was not sitting in the cockpit at the time of the crash: His body
was recovered from the Atlantic, whereas those of his two copilots sank to
the bottom of the ocean still attached to their seats. This would suggest
that Dubois was not wearing a seatbelt.

In contrast to many other airlines, it is standard practice at Air France
for the less experienced of the two copilots to take the captain's seat when
the latter is not there. The experienced copilot remains in his seat on the
right-hand side of the cockpit. Under normal circumstances, that is not a
problem, but in emergencies it can increase the likelihood of a crash.

As a consequence, it was probably the plane's third pilot, Pierre-Cédric
Bonin, a dashing amateur yachtsman, who steered the aircraft to its doom.
Bonin's wife was also on board, while their two children were at home with
their grandfather.

Part 4: Minute Three: Freefall

Not long after the airspeed indicator failed, the plane went out of control
and stalled. Presumably the airflow over the wings failed to provide lift.
Arnoux, from the pilots' union, estimates that the plane fell toward the sea
at about 42 meters per second (95 mph) -- almost the same speed as a
freefalling parachutist.

Arnoux's version of events is based in part on the timing of a transmitted
error message about the equalization of pressure between the cabin and the
outside of the plane, which usually happens at 2,000 meters (7,000 feet)
above sea level. Had the airplane nosedived, this alarm would have been
triggered earlier. "It takes almost exactly four minutes to freefall from
cruising altitude to sea level," Arnoux says.

According to this scenario, the pilots would have been forced to watch
helplessly as their plane lost its lift. That theory is supported by the
fact that the airplane remained intact to the very end. Given all the
turbulence, it is therefore possible that the passengers remained oblivious
to what was happening. After all, the oxygen masks that have been recovered
had not dropped down from the ceiling because of a loss of pressure. What's
more, the stewardesses weren't sitting on their emergency seats, and the
lifejackets remained untouched. "There is no evidence whatsoever that the
passengers in the cabin had been prepared for an emergency landing," says
BEA boss Jean-Paul Troadec.

Two seemingly insignificant lines from the warning reports transmitted by
the aircraft show how desperately the pilots fought to keep control. They
read "F/CTL PRIM 1 FAULT" and "F/CTL SEC 1 FAULT".

This somewhat cryptic shorthand suggest the pilots tried desperately to
restart the flight computer. "It's like trying to turn your car engine off
and then on again while driving along the motorway at night at 180
kilometers an hour (110mph)," says Arnoux.

The attempt to resuscitate the on-board computer proved unsuccessful. For
the last 600 meters (2,000 feet) before impact, the pilots' efforts would
have been accompanied by the chilling calls of an automated male voice:
"Terrain! Terrain! Pull up! Pull up!"

Part 5: Minute Four: Impact

More than 200 tons of metal, plastic, kerosene and human bodies smashed into
the sea. The sheer force of the impact is described in the forensic report,
which lists in graphic detail how lungs were torn apart and bones were
shredded end to end. Some of the passengers were sliced in half by their
seatbelt.

Much of the debris that has been recovered is no larger than a square meter
(10 square feet). The shear-lines run at a conspicuous angle. This shows
that the plane did not plunge vertically into the sea, but rather hit the
water like a flat hand, with the nose of the aircraft pointing upwards at a
five-degree angle. Of particular interest is the large tailfin that was
recovered from the ocean by the Brazilian navy. This was ripped from its
anchoring and catapulted forwards. From this, it can be deduced that the
A330 was brought to a halt with a force more than 36 times that of normal
gravity: 36g.

Although Airbus continues to play down the significance of the pitot tubes
in the crash of its A330, the company's engineers have since developed new
technologies that will detect the breakdown of airspeed sensors even before
takeoff. Airbus registered a patent for this technology in the US on Dec. 3,
2009. In the words of the patent application, errors in speed measurements
"can have catastrophic consequences."

For several years now, Airbus has offered its customers a special safety
program - called "Buss" -- at a cost of â?¬300,000 per aircraft. If the
airspeed indicator fails, this software shows pilots the angle at which they
must point the plane.

Up to now, Air France has chosen not to invest in this optional extra for
its fleet.



Translated from the German by Jan Liebelt